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Introduction/Abstract:
1In evaluating the United States drug regulatory system in 1978, Richard J. Crout posed a choice
between competing good values: “Do we want scientiﬁc rationality or personal freedom? And if we
want the latter, are we willing to pay the price of a few frauds here and there?”1 While the superiority
of one policy preference over the other remains uncertain, since the answer largely depends upon
the perspective of the “chooser” (i.e. consumer advocate or member/representative of the drug
industry), what has become clear over the intervening twenty-ﬁve years is that Crout’s proposed
tradeoﬀ has materialized. Changes in the structure of the law including passage of the Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), FDA’s 1997 draft guidance addressing
advertisements through broadcast media (such as radio and television communications) incorporated
under ﬁnal regulations promulgated in 1999, recent trends in the courts’ First Amendment treatment
of commercial speech concerning drugs, and the January 2002 Health and Human Services (HHS)
policy requiring FDA legal review of regulatory letters before they are sent to drugmakers, all
embody, either in theory or in practice, a loosening of the restrictions placed upon pharmaceutical
manufacturers. At the same time, fraudulent promotional practices pervade the marketplace as
manufacturers run deceptive ad campaigns marketing drugs as safer and/or more eﬀective than
they really are, obscuring and minimizing risks and/or failing to present information about adverse
side eﬀects, marketing unapproved uses for an approved drug, and commercializing experimental
drugs that have not yet received NDA approval. This paper will explore the impact, if any, had
by the changes in the legal landscape upon drugmakers’ marketing practices, raising the issues of
whether certain unlawful practices may in fact be desirable, and whether the current level of FDA
enforcement is appropriate to meet these practices.
Part I of this paper will address the extent of FDA’s jurisdiction to regulate promotional activities by or
on behalf of prescription drug manufacturers and provide a historical background for why regulation of
2prescription drug advertising is necessary. Part II will explore the rise of direct-to-consumer advertising and
the prevalence of misleading promotional materials in the context of the relaxed FDA guidance regarding
broadcast media and the HHS policy governing FDA regulatory letters. Part III will study advertising as
tailored to physicians and the relationship between drug companies and doctors against the background of
the FDAMA’s provision on dissemination of information on oﬀ-label drug use. Part IV will examine the First
Amendment constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech concerning drugs in the wake of recent
Supreme Court decisions and the Washington Legal Foundation cases. Part V will address manufacturers’
promotion of unapproved drugs in relation to the pros and cons of speeding patients’ access to new drugs.
Lastly, Part VI will examine proposed recommendations for FDA enforcement measures.
I. Scope of FDA’s Statutory Authority:
The ﬁrst federal law regulating the advertising of drug products was established in 1914 with the creation
of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), to which Congress delegated the authority to regulate “unfair
methods of competition in commerce,” a mandate interpreted by the agency to include the prohibition of
false and misleading advertisements.2 Enactment of the Wheeler-Lea Act in 1938 speciﬁcally empowered
the FTC to prevent the use of false or deceptive statements in advertisements of food, drugs, and cosmetics,
but left a loophole for prescription drug advertisements disseminated solely to physicians and failed to
provide the FTC with authority to compel an aﬃrmative disclosure of information.3 Thus, pharmaceutical
manufacturers were left without any check on their ability to present drug advertisements to physicians in
a misleading manner, resulting in product claims that lacked balanced information and were either wholly
2Pyrich, Alissa and Walsh, Charles J. “FDA Regulation of Pharmaceutical Advertising: Symposium on the U.S. Pharma-
ceutical Industry in the 1990’s: Facing Health Care Reform, Regulation and Judicial Controls.” 24 SHLR 1325, 1335 (1994).
3Id. at 1336-7.
3unsupported or supported by unreliable evidence. It was not until Congress enacted the 1962 Amendments
to the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act of 1938 (FDCA), in reaction to the thalidomide tragedy in Europe,
that eﬃcacy requirements were added for approval of new drug applications and exclusive jurisdiction was
transferred from the FTC to the FDA over prescription drug advertising.
Prior to these Amendments, the FDA expansively interpreted the authority it was given by the FDCA to
regulate the labeling of prescription drug products. “Labeling” is deﬁned by the FDCA to encompass “all
labels and other written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers,
or (2) accompanying any such article.”4 As the Supreme Court held in Kordel v. United States, the second
clause of § 321(m) is not limited to labels that are physically attached to the article, container, or wrapper
that is transported, so that promotional materials which perform the function of supplementing or explaining
the use of the product fall within the deﬁnition of labeling.5 If the labeling is “false or misleading in any
particular” or fails to bear “adequate directions for use” or “adequate warnings” against dangerous uses,
then the product is “deemed misbranded.”6
Under the FDCA of 1938, as amended, a drug product might also be deemed misbranded for failure to
comply with the minimum content requirements for advertisements. Although not expressly deﬁned within
the FDCA, examples of “advertisements” subject to FDA regulation have been listed by the FDA to include
“advertisements in published journals, magazines, other periodicals and newspapers, and advertisements
broadcast through media such as radio, television, and telephone communication systems.”7 Aﬃrmative
disclosure rules were ﬁrst promulgated by the FDA in 1963, but revised in the mid-1970s, so that the current
regulations for advertisements of prescription drugs require: (1) a true statement of the established name
421 U.S.C. § 321(m).
5Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345 (1948).
621 U.S.C. § 352(a) and (f).
721 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(1)(1993).
4for the drug and its formula; and (2) a brief summary of information about the drug relating to its side
eﬀects, contraindications for its use, and its eﬀectiveness.8 Advertisements must be fairly balanced so that
any negative or cautionary information is presented in comparable depth and detail as any claims about the
eﬀectiveness and safety of the drug.9 Moreover, pharmaceutical manufacturers are speciﬁcally prohibited
from promoting any unapproved use for an approved drug.10
Aside from a misbranding charge covering a violation of either the labeling or advertising provisions of the
FDCA, a third possible source of FDA statutory authority to regulate drug industry marketing activities
might be seen to stem from the FDCA prohibition against introduction into interstate commerce of any
unapproved new drug.11
The logic of the unapproved new drug argument follows from the idea that the FDA views statements about
the intended use of a product as capable of turning an approved new drug into an unapproved new drug.
However, the ﬂaw in this logic rests with the conﬂation of the two concepts of “drug” and “new drug.” The
phrase “intended use” comes from the deﬁnition of a “drug”: “articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, or prevention of disease;”12 whereas a “new drug” refers to any drug not generally recognized
as safe and eﬀective “for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling
thereof.”13 Thus, materials that do not constitute labeling cannot transform a “drug” into a “new drug,”
thereby limiting FDA’s new drug authority. FDA can still bring a misbranding charge, though, based on
non-labeling information that suggests an intended use for which the drug’s label fails to bear adequate
821 U.S.C. § 352(n).
9Supra note 2 at 1346.
1021 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a), (ii) & (iii); id. § 202.1(e)(6)(i).
11Boulding, Mark E. “The Statutory Basis for FDA Regulation of Scientiﬁc and Educational Information.” 4 J. Pharmacy
& L. 123, 128-9 (1995).
1221 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1).
1321 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (emphasis added).
5directions.14
Even once the statutory authority for FDA regulation has been located, it is still important to ask why gov-
ernment regulation of prescription drug advertising is at all necessary? If advertising regulation is primarily
aimed at protecting consumers from false, misleading, or deceptive product claims in terms of preserving
consumers’ economic and health related expectations, won’t the economic self-interest of manufacturers, in
turn, prompt most advertisers to avoid false or misleading claims or to correct inaccuracies before consumer
conﬁdence is undermined in the product? The problem with leaving advertising to market self-regulation in
the case of prescription drugs is that these products, termed “credence goods,” possess qualities that cannot
be assessed by the consumer through normal use.15 Thus, even experienced health care professionals depend
upon pharmaceutical manufacturers to provide accurate and reliable information about how and when to
use their products. Moreover, taking into account the potential side eﬀects of death or serious injury from
false or misleading information about drug products, the need for governmental regulation of prescription
drug advertising becomes readily apparent.
II. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and Misleading Messages:
Serving the twin policy goals of “providing consumers with adequate communication of the required risk
information,” while facilitating the process used by advertisers to market their products to consumers, the
FDA issued a non-binding proposed guidance in 1997 to relax the “brief summary” requirement for radio
and television advertisements.16 Formerly, only “help-seeking” and “reminder” advertisements were exempt
from having to contain a brief summary describing the drug’s side eﬀects, contraindications, warnings,
14Supra note 11 at 138.
15Supra note 2 at 1330-1.
16Draft Guidance for Industry; Consumer-Direct Broadcast Advertisements, 62 Fed. Reg. 43, 172 (1997).
6and indications for use.17 While print media could easily comply with the brief summary requirement by
reproducing the text of the package insert in the advertisement, broadcast advertisers were subject to special
constraints. Under the current FDA regulatory guidelines promulgated in 1999,18 an “adequate provision”
requirement was implemented to modify the brief summary standard for radio and television advertising, so
that drug manufacturers may simply identify the product’s major risks in lay language during the broadcast,
as long as the manufacturer provides for the delivery of approved package labeling in connection with the
broadcast presentation.19
What if any impact did the relaxed regulatory guidelines for broadcast media have upon direct-to-consumer
(DTC) advertising? A study by the Kaiser Family Foundation suggests that increases in DTC spending
on television advertising were rapid even before the FDA draft guidance in 1997, so that the “adequate
provision” rules could be seen as a response to shifts in promotional activity that had already occurred, as
opposed to fueling the entire growth in DTC ads.20 Still, health care experts cite DTC advertising as a
leading cause of soaring prescription drug costs, with DTC spending having tripled to $2.7 billion worth a
year, roughly two-thirds on television and radio, since the FDA loosened drug promotion rules in 1997.21
Prescription drug costs, driven largely by higher utilization and also by higher pharmacy prices needed to
recoup the huge expense of drug ads, increased nineteen percent in 2000 and another seventeen percent in
17Ausness, Richard C. “Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to Greater Tort Liability for Prescription Drug
Manufacturers?” 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 97, 102 (2002):
“Rogaine advertisements, which suggested that products were available to prevent hair loss but did not identify any of these
products by name, exempliﬁed the help-seeking variety of advertisement. The ‘blue skies’ Claritin advertisements of the early
1990s, which mentioned the product by name but failed to mention its medicinal purpose, exempliﬁed the reminder type of
advertisement.”
18See FDA, Guidance for Industry: Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements (Aug. 1999).
Available at: http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/index.htm.
19Supra note 17 at 103:
The sponsor can disseminate the contents of the approved package label to consumers by:
(1) providing a toll-free telephone number where such information can be requested; (2) referring in the broadcast advertisement
to a print advertisement or brochures available to the public which contain such information; (3) advising listeners or viewers
to ask a pharmacist or doctor for further information about the product; and (4) providing an Internet web site where such
information can be obtained.
20Frank, Richard, Ph.D. et al. “Trends in Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs.” The Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation. (Feb. 2002). Available at: www.kﬀ.org.
21“Misleading Drug Ads Slip Under Regulators’ Radar.” USA Today, Jan. 6, 2003.
72001, with almost half of the increase in 2000 being driven by sales of the ﬁfty most heavily advertised
drugs.22 The Kaiser study found that high DTC spending generally appears to be associated with new
products that have no generic competitors, although in some cases, manufacturers of products nearing the
end of patent protection advertise directly to consumers because they need to build brand equity for the
switch to over-the-counter status.23 Spending on DTC advertising is concentrated among a relatively small
number of products, particularly drugs used to treat chronic conditions like allergies, high cholesterol, and
ulcers.24 Moreover, many of the heavily advertised new drugs are simply “me too” medicines – basically the
same as previously approved drugs whose patent expired about the same time the new drug was released.25
Promoting costly new drugs without proportionately improving beneﬁts puts pressure on corporate insurance
plans and public programs which leads to reduced access, fewer beneﬁts, and higher co-payments.26
An implicit assumption underlying the FDA’s special accommodation of DTC advertising is that this method
of marketing is beneﬁcial – but for whom aside from pharmaceutical manufacturers? According to FDA’s
January 2003 release of preliminary results from a survey asking 500 physicians about DTC prescription
drug advertising, doctors cited positive public health beneﬁts such as increased patient awareness of diseases
that can be treated and more thoughtful questions raised during the doctor visit.27 Dr. Martin S. Lipsky,
professor and chair of family medicine at Northwestern University’s Feinberg School of Medicine, commented
that, “In addition to calling attention to undertreated disorders, drug ads may make people more accepting
of necessary treatments.”28 Jeﬀ Trewhitt of the industry’s Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA) noted that “direct-to-consumer advertising may also prompt improved compliance with
22“Free reign for drug ads?” Consumer Reports (Feb. 2003), p.36.
23Supra note 20.
24Id.
25Supra note 22.
26Landauer, Robert. Editorial: “Oregon Seeks Drug-Hype Antidotes.” Portland Oregonian (April 2002).
27FDA Talk Paper: “FDA Releases Preliminary Results of Physician Survey on Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug
Advertisements.” (Jan. 2003) Available at: http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2003/ANS01189.html.
28Supra note 22 at 34.
8medical treatments, which are cost-eﬀective compared to the costs of surgery and hospitalization.”29
Nonetheless, the FDA survey results are not unequivocally beneﬁcial for consumers: ﬁfty-nine percent of
physicians said having seen a drug commercial added no beneﬁt to a patient’s subsequent doctor visit; eight
percent of doctors said they felt very pressured to prescribe the speciﬁc brand name drug the patient wanted,
regardless of whether a diﬀerent drug was more appropriate or a less expensive drug was available; about
seventy-ﬁve percent of physicians believed that DTC advertising causes patients to think the drug works
better than it really does; and only forty percent of physicians believed that patients understand very well or
somewhat well the risks and negative eﬀects of an advertised drug from the DTC ad alone.30 It is important
to note, though, that eighty-two percent of physicians believed that patients understand either very well or
somewhat well that “only a doctor can decide if the drug is right for the patient.”31 This high percentage
ﬁts with the results of a recent patient survey by the National Consumers League which found that many
patients use drug ads only as starting points for more information because they realize the ads are trying to
sell drugs.32
The positive public health beneﬁts discussed earlier, though, rest on a second implicit assumption behind the
FDA’s authorization of direct-to-consumer advertising: namely, that drug makers are telling the truth about
what they’re marketing. However, lifting the restrictions on television and radio advertisements has opened
the door to misleading ads that create unrealistic expectations and/or dismiss potential adverse side eﬀects.
In 1998, one year after the FDA allowed companies to advertise prescription drugs directly to consumers,
the agency issued 157 warnings about deceptive ads.33 Consumer Reports magazine conducted a computer-
29Id. at 36.
30Supra note 27.
31Id.
32The Associated Press. “Many Physicians Say Ads Don’t Beneﬁt Patients.” Newday, Jan. 21, 2003.
33Supra note 21.
9assisted analysis of 564 letters to prescription drugmakers posted on the FDA’s web site from January
1997 through November 2002 to determine the nature and scope of false or misleading drug promotions.34
“Omitting, minimizing, or obscuring a drug’s risks” was the most common transgression, with 363 citations,
followed by “inadequate or incorrect labeling information” at 230 citations, “misleading comparative or
superiority claims” at 214 citations, and “false or unsubstantiated eﬃcacy claims” at 203 citations.35
Speciﬁc examples of misleading promotional activities by pharmaceutical manufacturers help bring these
transgressions to light. Pﬁzer, maker of the cholesterol drug Lipitor, has been cited four times in four years
for ads giving the wrong impression that it can reduce heart disease and falsely claiming Lipitor is safer than
competing drugs.36 Pﬁzer was again implicated in January 2003, this time for a $6-million settlement with
nineteen states that accused the company of misrepresenting the performance of Zithromax (an antibiotic
used to treat severe ear infections in children), by focusing on fewer doses per day and fewer days needed
for medication compared with competitors, and also failing to disclose the various factors that physicians
take into account when prescribing a treatment for ear infections.37 Also in January 2003, makers of the
painkiller Oxycontin were warned by the FDA to immediately cease running print ads for the drug which
“grossly overstate the safety proﬁle of OxyContin by not referring in the body of the advertisements to serious,
potentially fatal risks associated with the drug.”38 The year before, the FDA reprimanded four drugmakers
for misleading promotions in the month of January: AstraZeneca for its Nolvadex advertisements (a breast
cancer drug) which failed to point out that the drug may increase a patient’s risk of developing uterine
cancer; ICN Pharmaceuticals Inc. for its advertisements for Efudex (used to treat pre-cancerous lesions)
34Supra note 22 at 35.
35Id.
36Supra note 21.
37The Associated Press. “Pﬁzer to Pay States $6M.” Newsday, Jan. 7, 2003.
38Adams, Chris. “FDA Asks Maker of OxyContin to Pull ‘Misleading’ Print Ads.” The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 23, 2003:
Note: Purdue Pharma LP ran the OxyContin ads in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) and claimed
the ads were aimed at doctors, not the general public.
10which downplayed risks such as the potential for miscarriage when applied during pregnancy; Pharmacia
Corp. for claims about the drug Genotropin (used to treat stunted growth) which confused readers by failing
to denote the drug’s approval only for children up to age two; and Abbott Laboratories for distributing
promotional materials about the Meridia obesity drug that overstated the drug’s eﬃcacy.39 Perhaps even
more controversial is the claim that pharmaceutical companies have created a new disorder of female sexual
dysfunction to build a market for Viagra and similar drugs among women by wrongly “medicalizing” female
sexual problems and greatly exaggerating the number of women aﬀected.40 While drugmakers say knowledge
of the condition pre-dated Viagra and they are simply seeking a treatment option for millions of women with
sexual diﬃculties, author of the British Medical Journal article disclosing the allegedly corporate sponsored
creation of the disease argued that the ﬁgures cited by the industry for female sexual dysfunction were
misleading and potentially dangerous.41
FDA Enforcement Response:
Ironically, as the need for even stricter FDA oversight is made clear by the increase in spending on direct-to-
consumer advertising and the proliferation of misleading messages that are thereby reaching consumers, the
regulatory process has instead been dramatically slowed by a Bush administration policy change. Typically,
promotions for new prescription drugs must be submitted to the FDA when they’re ﬁrst used, but drug
companies can run the ads without pre-approval, subject to post-market enforcement by the FDA in the
form of a “notice of violation” or “warning letter.”42 If a company ignores a warning letter sent by the FDA,
39Bloomberg News. “FDA Reprimands 4 Drug Makers for Misleading Promotions.” Los Angeles Times, Jan. 16, 2002.
40Reuters. “Article: Sex Disorder Made Up.” Newsday, Jan 4, 2003. See also “Female impotence:
Firms under ﬁre” and “Study suggests women’s sex problems may be less than thought” both available at:
http://www.cnn.com/2003/Health/conditions/
41Id.
42But see FDA non-binding guidance on pre-approval promotion: Hayes, Thomas A., M.D. “Drug Labeling and Promotion:
Evolution and Application of Regulatory Policy.” 51 Food & Drug L.J. 57, 67 (1996): The guidance lists two basic forms of
11the agency can then take the company to court to enforce compliance. Following the Bush administration
procedure implemented in January 2002, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) began
requiring legal review of all proposed regulatory letters about drug ads before they are mailed to the oﬀending
company.43 According to HHS oﬃcials, the purpose behind this extra step is to ensure that the FDA can
back up its claims about misleading ads if challenged in court. However, an investigative report made public
by the General Accounting Oﬃce (GAO) in December 2002 found that the new procedure has held up FDA
letters from two to eleven weeks.44 From 1997 to 2002, the FDA sent eighty-eight letters to companies
citing inaccurate advertising claims about a drug’s safety or eﬃcacy, and the companies stopped running the
misleading ads in all cases. In contrast, evaluating a letter now takes up to seventy-eight days.45 According
to Dr. Sidney Wolfe of the Public Citizen consumer advocacy group, by mid-December of 2002, the FDA had
issued only twenty-seven letters ordering drug companies to stop a misleading ad, down from a high of 157
in 1998.46 Congressional investigators announced that misleading advertisements “often had run through
their schedules and gone oﬀ the air by the time the agency got around to chastising their makers.”47 Thus,
review of letters intended to warn drugmakers that the FDA is prepared to take legal action if the companies
don’t comply with advertising regulations essentially undercuts that aim by signaling to the drug industry
that “intensive, quick-hit promotional campaigns are eﬀectively immune from sanction.”48
In defense of the pharmaceutical industry, Bruce Kuhlik, a lawyer for PhRMA, said “the fact that the
announcement that are acceptable. The ﬁrst uses the product name and the second, known as the “institutional” or “corporate”
format, identiﬁes only the area of research involved in developing the new product. Restrictions on pre-approval promotion
vary depending on the format employed.
43Supra note 22 at 34.
44Id.
45“FDA Seeks Rx for Drug Ads / New policy delays process.” Newsday, Dec. 5, 2002.
46The Associated Press. “New Commissioner of FDA Pledges to Fight Misleading Drug Ads: But Agency has Issued Fewer
Warning Letters, Consumer Advocate Says.” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 12, 2002.
47Id.
48Supra note 21.
12number of requests to end misleading ads has dropped indicates that the industry is doing a better job at
complying with the law.”49 Meanwhile, industry representatives focus on the GAO’s report showing that far
more dollars are spent on research and development of drugs than on promotions.50 Yet, as Representative
Henry Waxman, of California, pointed out, “The precipitous drop in enforcement actions may be a welcome
development for the drug industry, but it poses serious dangers to public health.”51 His sentiment is echoed
by consumer advocates like Wolfe from Public Citizen who noted the “chilling eﬀect” of the policy change
on the regulatory process and commented that misleading advertisements, “can make the diﬀerence between
someone getting the right drug and the wrong drug; it’s a health and safety issue.”52 FDA’s commissioner,
Mark McClellan, and inspector general at HHS, Janet Rehnquist, both promised faster action and set a goal
for the agency to issue enforcement letters within ﬁfteen working days. However, the resource constraints
faced by the FDA in terms of staﬃng shortages53 and the inability to levy ﬁnes upon drug companies, coupled
with the fact that ad campaigns may still be able to run their course even within the shorter turnover time,
place administrative and practical obstacles in the path of FDA’s ability to meet this goal.
Politics of a well-connected industry?
Just as the HHS executive policy requiring FDA legal review signals lax enforcement to the pharmaceutical
industry – “which has given more than $45 in campaign contributions since 1999”54 – politics may also play
a role in changing the regulatory terrain through the courts, as demonstrated by the result of the class-action
lawsuit brought by thirty-ﬁve patients suﬀering withdrawal symptoms from the anti-depressant drug Paxil.55
49Powell, Jennifer Heldt. “FDA spanked on policing of drug ads.” Boston Herald, Dec. 5, 2002.
50Id.
51Supra note 22 at 34.
52Supra note 46.
53“The oﬃce, responsible for evaluating all direct-to-consumer drug advertising, currently employs just ﬁve people, with two
slots vacant.” Supra note 45. See also supra note 22: “The agency has only about 30 reviewers to handle the roughly 30,000
submissions each year.”
54Supra note 21.
55Lota, Louinn. “Paxil’s maker ordered to pull ‘misleading’ ads.” The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Aug. 21, 2002.
13Daniel E. Troy, chief legal counsel of the FDA since August 2001, championed the causes of pharmaceutical
companies against the FDA for years prior to joining the agency. Even after assuming the role of chief
counsel, Troy ﬁled a brief in defense of GlaxoSmithKline in the Paxil case, aligning the FDA’s position
with that of the industry by saying “the FDA agrees with the allegation that Paxil is not a habit-forming
drug.”56 The characteristic of “habit-forming” turned on the distinction between “withdrawal symptoms”
versus “discontinuation syndrome,” but the underlying question remained “whether patients, lacking medical
or legal education, could be expected to know the scientiﬁc diﬀerence between those phrases.”57 U.S. District
Judge Mariana Pfaelzer answered this question in the negative, holding the ads to be misleading and ordering
the maker of Paxil to halt all television commercials nationwide that claim the drug is not habit-forming.58
The judge ended up lifting her temporary order, however, in response to Troy’s argument that the FDA has
the ultimate authority to decide the question, and had already reviewed the precise ad prior to use without
raising any objections to the language at issue.59 Troy’s position may be seen as hypocritical, though, as
one of the plaintiﬀ attorneys in another anti-depressant drug case points out: “Dan Troy basically built
his career representing pharmaceutical companies suing the FDA, arguing that FDA determinations are
arbitrary and capricious...[now] he has been issuing this mantra that the court cannot review the FDA’s
factual determination.”60 Pfaelzer herself wrote, “It is diﬃcult to imagine that the FDA would object to
the removal of the reference that ‘Paxil is not habit-forming.”’61
In this way, the role of politics combines with the issue of limited resources to pose both internal and external
constraints upon the FDA, weakening its stance against the pharmaceutical industry and hampering its
ability to halt misleading DTC promotions.
56Kranish, Michael. “FDA Counsel’s Rise Embodies U.S. Shift.” The Boston Globe, Dec. 22, 2002.
57Id.
58Supra note 55.
59Supra note 56.
60Id.
61Id.
14III. Drug Promotions to Physicians and the Impact of the FDAMA:
Despite the disproportionate growth in DTC ads relative to other forms of drug promotion over the last
decade, physicians remain the primary focus of marketing eﬀorts, including both oﬃce-based and hospital
based physician promotion, the retail value of free samples, and advertising in medical journals.62 Moreover,
from January 1997 through November 2002, doctors and others who prescribe medicines were exposed to
nearly four times as many messages deemed false or misleading by the FDA as were consumers.63 The tension
between scientiﬁc rationality and personal freedom surfaces here with respect to the regulatory treatment of
one such type of misinformation provided to doctors – promotion of approved drugs for unapproved purposes,
referred to as “oﬀ-label” indications.
The term “oﬀ-label” comes by inference from FDA drug product labeling requirements. Pharmaceutical
companies are required to convey, in the drug’s formal labeling, information necessary for safe and eﬀective
use of the product (i.e. warnings, precautions, indications, contraindications, clinical pharmacology, adverse
reactions, etc.) for those particular uses for which the drug was approved. All other uses are designated as
“oﬀ-label,” encompassing “use by persons other than those for whom the drug was approved, use in dosages
other than the approved dosages, use for conditions other than those indicated in the labeling, and use in
unapproved combination with other drugs.”64 Oﬀ-label prescription of drugs, like oﬀ-label use itself, is not
per se unlawful. A physician may, as part of the practice of medicine, vary the conditions of use for a pre-
scription drug from those approved in the package insert without ﬁrst informing or obtaining the consent of
62Supra note 20.
63Supra note 22.
64Salbu, Steven R. “Oﬀ-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and
Regulatory Policy.” 51 Fla. L. Rev. 181, 188 (1999).
15the FDA.65 Similarly, the manner in which a drug is used lies within the independent control of the patient
once the prescription drug is in his/her hands. However, as discussed above under Part I, FDA’s regulation
of product labeling authorizes the agency to prevent manufacturers from distributing promotional materials
advocating oﬀ-label uses of approved drugs. The rationale behind this prohibition, to protect the public
health from harmful oﬀ-label uses and ensure complete and accurate information regarding the use and risk
of drugs, ties into the rationale behind the new drug approval (NDA) process.
With the “eﬃcacy” requirements added to the safety provisions of the NDA process in 1962, Congress
speciﬁed the “substantial evidence”66 standard for clinical data that a manufacturer must submit for each
intended use of the drug. Information regarding unapproved uses correspondingly lacks the guarantee of
pre-clinical and Phase I, II and III scientiﬁc support for those uses, thus giving rise to the FDA’s general
unwillingness to allow promotion of such uses. If a pharmaceutical manufacturer wishes an oﬀ-label use to
be added to the drug’s labeling, the manufacturer must submit new reports of clinical trials regarding the
new use. The results of the Phase I study (showing overall safety and absence of adverse eﬀects) that was
already conducted for the approved drug would probably be suﬃcient, however new Phase II and Phase III
trials – the most expensive part of the new drug approval process – would still be required to demonstrate
the eﬃcacy of the new use.67 Moreover, the median approval time for standard drug applications increased
in 2002 to 15.3 months, up from 14 months in 2001 and 12 months in 2000.68 Thus, the tediousness and
expensiveness of FDA procedures coupled with the fact that inclusion of a new use in the drug’s labeling
may not even increase the drug’s sales (considering that oﬀ-label applications might already be well known
65“Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug
Administration: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.” 37 Fed. Reg. 16503 (Aug. 15, 1972).
66The 1962 Drug Amendments deﬁned “substantial evidence” as:
“evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, by experts qualiﬁed by scientiﬁc training and experience to
evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded by such experts
that the drug will have the eﬀect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or
suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
67Weeks, Elizabeth A. “Is it Worth the Trouble? The New Policy on Dissemination of Information on Oﬀ-Label Drug Use
Under the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997.” 54 Food and Drug L.J. 645, 655 (1999).
68“FDA Capsules: Drug Approval Times.” Newsday, Jan. 21, 2003.
16and in widespread use), explain pharmaceutical manufacturers’ disincentive to seek permission to market
oﬀ-label uses of their products.
The FDA’s own regulations are actually diﬃcult to reconcile with the question of whether restrictions on
the dissemination of oﬀ-label information should be upheld. While Section 202.1(e)(4) of the agency’s ad-
vertising regulations provide that manufacturers cannot recommend or suggest any use that is not in the
labeling in an approved NDA, Section 312.7(a) of the investigational new drug (IND) regulations qualify
the prohibition on representing an investigational drug as safe and eﬀective “in a promotional context” by
encouraging the “full exchange of scientiﬁc information concerning the drug.”69 While the latter statement
comes from a section dealing with investigational drugs as opposed to approved, marketed drugs, the same
policy of encouraging scientiﬁc dialogue and innovation by giving manufacturers more personal freedom can
be applied to the promotion of oﬀ-label uses for approved drugs. Kenneth R. Feather, acting director of the
FDA Division of Drug Advertising and Labeling in 1989, raised the countervailing policy point of scientiﬁc
rationality in a speech during the annual meeting of the PMA Marketing Section: “If most of these [oﬀ-label]
uses are not going to be adequately studied and proven, how can this information help a physician use the
drug ‘properly’? ...Doesn’t this look more like a way to make sure the drug is used for all of these problems,
without the company having to do the studies to properly prove them?”70 In answering the threshold ques-
tion of how to identify what constitutes prohibited oﬀ-label marketing in contrast to permissible scientiﬁc
exchange – attempting to strike the appropriate balance between access to information and protection of the
general welfare – the FDA and Congress developed a regulatory approach in the 1990s designed to liberalize
the dissemination of information regarding oﬀ-label uses. Whether the rules operate in practice to achieve
that result and whether the intended result would even be desirable if achieved is subject to debate.
The “gray area” for the distinction between promotion and education arises when, for example, sponsors of
69Hutt, Peter Barton and Merrill, Richard A. Food and Drug Law. Foundation Press, New York (1991). p.462
70Id. at 463.
17approved drugs distribute medical journal articles - written by parties unaﬃliated with the industry sponsor
- that discuss the results of clinical investigations of oﬀ-label uses of the drugs.71 The FDA issued a draft
guidance in December 1995, followed by promulgation of a ﬁnal guidance in October 1996, explaining the
circumstances under which dissemination of oﬀ-label use reprints would be acceptable for pharmaceutical
manufacturers. Any articles distributed must be “peer-reviewed, published descriptions of the original clin-
ical studies assessing drug eﬀectiveness ...and the principal subject of the article should be the use(s) or
indication(s) approved by FDA.”72 Textbooks containing discussions of oﬀ-label uses are also permitted
(maintaining the requirement that the principal subject pertain to approved uses) as long as the manufac-
turer did not inﬂuence the production of the text or request to serve as the book’s primary distributor.73
Whether articles or textbooks, the package insert is the only acceptable form of information that may be
attached to the materials distributed.74
The FDA guidance, found unconstitutional in Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) v. Friedman,75 was
superceded in 1997 by Section 401 of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA),
which added Sections 551-557 to the FDCA, establishing speciﬁc conditions under which drugmakers can
lawfully disseminate oﬀ-label use materials.76 The FDAMA allows for distribution of unabridged versions of
qualiﬁed written information77 concerning the safety, eﬀectiveness, or beneﬁt of oﬀ-label uses to the follow-
ing enumerated groups: (1) health care practitioners, (2) pharmacy beneﬁt managers, (3) health insurance
issuers, (4) group health plans, and (5) federal or state government agencies.78 Note that to qualify for the
71Ward, Shane M. “WLF and the Two-Click Rule: The First Amendment Inequity of the Food and Drug Administration’s
Regulation of Oﬀ-Label Drug Use Information on the Internet.” 56 Food & Drug L.J. 41, 46 (2001).
72Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800 (1996).
73Id.
74Id.
7513 F. Supp. 2d at 74. Note: the WLF cases will be discussed infra under Part IV of this paper.
76Supra note 71 at 47.
77Qualiﬁed written information refers to a:
(A) reprint or copy of an article, peer-reviewed by experts qualiﬁed by scientiﬁc training or expertise ...which was published
in a scientiﬁc journal ...which is about a clinical investigation with respect to the drug ...; or
(B) reference publication ...that includes information about a clinical investigation with respect to the drug that would be
considered to be scientiﬁcally sound by experts qualiﬁed ...” Id.
78Id at 48.
18FDAMA provisions, pharmaceutical manufacturers must have already ﬁled a new drug application for the
prescription drug.
Despite the apparent loosening of restrictions on manufacturers’ ability to market oﬀ-label indications, ad-
ministrative obstacles remain in place to counteract the freedom provided by the legislation such that critics
of the FDAMA question whether any reform has in fact been made. The FDAMA mandates that the man-
ufacturer submit the oﬀ-label materials to the FDA sixty days prior to distribution along with any available
clinical data related to the safety and eﬀectiveness of the new use.79 Also prior to dissemination, the man-
ufacturer must certify to FDA one of the following: a supplemental application for the new use has been
submitted; a supplemental application will be submitted within six months of dissemination; acceptable
clinical protocols for the studies have been submitted and the corresponding supplement will be ﬁled within
thirty-six months; or the product sponsor falls under one of two exemptions on the basis that submitting a
supplemental application would be “economically prohibitive” or “unethical.”80 In addition to the supple-
mental application requirement, there is a disclosure requirement that eligible information must be objective
and balanced (not false or misleading) and must be accompanied by “prominently displayed disclosures of
the unapproved nature of the use, the ﬁnancial interests of the party disseminating the information, and any
relationship between the sponsor and the author, including possible sources of research bias.”81 The infor-
mation must also be accompanied by a bibliography listing references to other publications or journal articles
concerning the particular drug.82 The FDAMA provides a ﬁnal safeguard in the form of corrective action
by the Secretary of HHS should he/she determine that the new use is “ineﬀective or signiﬁcantly risky to
public health,” or that the manufacturer has failed to comply with the statutory requirements.83 The FDA
may then require the manufacturer to submit additional information and/or order the manufacturer to cease
79Id.
80Id.
81Id.
82Supra note 64 at 216.
83Id.
19dissemination of the oﬀ-label materials altogether. In November 1998, the FDA promulgated implementing
regulations for the FDAMA, giving substance to the terms “new use”84 and “scientiﬁcally sound,”85 as well
as conﬁrming that exceptions to the supplemental application requirement will be interpreted narrowly.86
Would it be desirable to eliminate the supplemental restrictions and thereby enable the FDAMA to have more
of a practical eﬀect in freeing manufacturers to distribute oﬀ-label information? What is the appropriate
level of regulatory control? The concern about scientiﬁc validity of industry research conducted outside of
the NDA process, whether because the standards applied may be less rigorous or because the results may
be biased when ﬁnanced by for-proﬁt companies, cuts in favor of maintaining restrictions on information
dissemination for unapproved uses of approved drugs. Similarly, making oﬀ-label information more readily
available may increase patient exposure to riskier treatment methods and pose serious health consequences.
On the other hand, the lengthy NDA process may work to the detriment of patients by delaying their
ability to obtain beneﬁcial therapies; a physician might have been able to competently evaluate the needs
and risks of his/her patient to arrive at a less conservative risk-beneﬁt calculus in a shorter time frame.87
As portrayed in a Letter to the Editor by the General Counsel of the Competitive Enterprise Institute
in Washington, “Overcaution in evaluating new life-saving therapies can be as deadly as lack of caution.
Doctors need more information about oﬀ-label use, not less. The real threat to public health isn’t from oﬀ-
label research, but from attempts to restrict it.”88 Just because scientiﬁc research is industry-sponsored does
not necessarily mean the results lack validity, and doctors as “learned intermediaries” are in a better position
than consumers to make this determination. Oﬀ-label uses can constitute the most eﬀective treatment or
84“New use” is deﬁned broadly to include: “indications, dosing schedules, routes of administration, age groups and patient
populations not identiﬁed explicitly in the labeling.” See 21 C.F.R. § 99.3(g); 63 Fed. Reg. at 64,559.
85See id. § 99.101(a)(2); 63 Fed. Reg. at 64,583.
86Supra note 71 at 49.
87Supra note 67 at 658-9.
88Kazman, Sam. Letter to the Editor: “Oﬀ-Label Drug Studies: Overcaution is Risky.” The Wall Street Journal. Jan. 14,
2002.
20even be considered the standard of care,89 particularly in the case of pediatric prescriptions since many drugs
are not tested for use by children.90 It is also important to factor resources into the analysis in so much as
the costs of an absolute ban of oﬀ-label promotion by pharmaceutical manufacturers would cost less than
a monitored dissemination scheme under the FDAMA. Moreover, oﬀ-label marketing might actually be a
potential source of cost-containment in so much as subjecting all uses of a drug to FDA approval increases
the number of clinical trials conducted, raises manufacturer research and development expenditures, and
consequently passes costs on to consumers in the form of price increases.91 The possibility of alternative
means to reduce the risks associated with oﬀ-label applications other than restrictions on the dissemination
of information to physicians will be discussed under enforcement recommendations in Part VI of this paper.
Too Close for Comfort?
While the FDAMA permits drug companies to share research and journal articles that discuss unapproved
uses for approved drugs, pharmaceutical manufacturers are still prohibited from suggesting to physicians that
they incorporate those uses into their practices. However, Continuing Medical Education (CME) courses
are not subject to this same restriction and may discuss unapproved uses of commercially available drugs,
which doctors are then free to prescribe as they deem ﬁt.92 Thus, through corporate-sponsorship of CME
courses, there exists a “backdoor way” for companies to establish close relationships with doctors and more
broadly promote oﬀ-label indications for their products – an advertising strategy which has intensiﬁed since
the pharmaceutical industry adopted a new voluntary marketing code of conduct, eﬀective July 1, 2002.93
According to PhRMA President Alan F. Holmer, the code “explicitly spells out that all interactions should
89Id. In chemotherapy, doctors might actually be guilty of malpractice for limiting their prescriptions to FDA-approved uses.
90Supra note 64 at 193.
91Id. at 195.
92Hensley, Scott. “Remedial Lessons: When Doctors Go to Class, Industry Often Foots the Bill.” The Wall Street Journal,
Dec. 4, 2002.
93Id.
21be focused on informing healthcare professionals about products, providing scientiﬁc and educational infor-
mation, and supporting medical research and education.”94 The code goes on to state that “nothing should
be oﬀered [by industry] or provided in a manner or on conditions that would interfere with the independence
of a health care professional’s prescribing practices.”95 The tactical shift by manufacturers from bestowing
lavish gifts upon doctors to paying for or oﬀering more consulting opportunities, continuing medical educa-
tion courses, and dinners billed as educational events with specialist speakers was occurring even before the
industry announced the new guidelines in July. The money spent by pharmaceutical ﬁrms on meetings and
events including CME classes, teleconferences, dinners, symposia and get-togethers with physician advisers
more than doubled over four years to $2.1 billion in 2001.96 The question remains, then, whether this form of
involvement fulﬁlls the goals of the industry’s code to beneﬁt patients and enhance the practice of medicine
without exerting improper inﬂuence over physicians?
Drugmakers point to the beneﬁts of continuing medical education classes in that they provide physicians
with crucial information about medicines and medical advances that can help patients, while at the same
time creating a forum at which doctors can communicate with each other about their experiences. Thirty-six
states require doctors to take continuing education to maintain their medical licenses; in those states, the
average requirement is about twenty-seven hours of lectures or seminars a year.97 Jeﬀrey Lieberman, profes-
sor of psychiatry at the University of North Carolina and a paid speaker for a number of industry-sponsored
CME courses commented that, “For academic medicine to not avail itself of the resources of the pharmaceu-
tical industry and private sector would be foolish.” Universities and hospitals that formerly charged doctors
registration fees to attend class now routinely take money from the drug industry since physicians have
94“PhRMA Adopts New Marketing Code.” April 19, 2002. Available at:
http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/19.04.2002.390.cfm
95Id.
96Kowalczyk, Liz. “Drug Firms and Doctors: The Oﬀers Pour In.” The Boston Globe, Dec. 15, 2002.
97Supra note 92.
22grown accustomed to industry-subsidized education and resist paying even small amounts.98
Nonetheless, a concern expressed by Dr. Marcia Angell, former editor of the New England Journal of
Medicine, that drug companies will “simply disguise marketing as education, slanting presentations toward
their own products and helping to increase health-care costs,”99 mirrors the belief articulated by Kenneth
R. Feather in 1989 that a pharmaceutical manufacturing ﬁrm should not be able to “disseminate any infor-
mation it wishes simply because they disguise it as a seminar or call it ‘education.”’100 The inherent bias
and conﬂict of interest that arises when companies oﬀer education about a product they’re trying to sell
undermines the drug companies’ professed goal of disseminating scientiﬁc information in an objective and
non-promotional manner. The lack of enforcement provisions within the drug-industry code of ethics and the
lack of FDA enforcement of its own regulations designed to prevent companies from using the educational
system as a marketing device confounds this problem. The FDA’s main criteria for CME courses require
that they be accredited and that drug companies not control course preparation, delivery, or content.101 Yet,
drug companies remain free to suggest speakers as long as the education provider has the ﬁnal approval, and
some medical educators say that with corporate industry in control of the agenda, “doctors end up hearing
a lot more about medical conditions that can be treated with expensive brand-name drugs and less about
subjects from which manufacturers can’t proﬁt.”102
Post-marketing studies conducted for already-approved drugs tie into drug companies’ “backdoor” promotion
of oﬀ-label indications at company-sponsored educational gatherings. For example, the marketers of Aricept,
an Alzheimer drug approved only for mild to moderate stages of the disease, outlined the results of post-
98Id.
99Supra note 96.
100Supra note 70.
101Supra note 92.
102Id.
23marketing studies to doctors at a January 2001 conference in Florida showing that the drug could help
Alzheimer’s even at late stages of the disease.103 While the FDA doesn’t allow drug company salespeople to
mention post-market study results if unsolicited by the doctors to whom the information is being presented,
psychiatrists claim that Aricept sales representatives are “deﬁnitely pushing the fact” that the drug can be
of assistance regardless of the severity of the disease.104 The rationale behind restricting the availability
of oﬀ-label use information re-surfaces here in so much as post-marketing studies enable ﬁrms to skirt the
NDA process with studies that might not pass muster with the FDA. Yet, the marketers of Aricept denied
any eﬀorts to bypass the NDA process, maintaining that their presentation of the studies has been “faithful
to the data.”105 Moreover, the beneﬁts of oﬀ-label use must not be ignored as post-marketing studies are
necessary to learn more about how a particular drug works if medical improvements are to be made for
progressive, largely untreatable diseases.
In evaluating the desirability and eﬃcacy of regulatory action governing drug makers’ promotion of oﬀ-label
uses for approved drugs, it is important to trace the analysis back one step prior and consider whether there
exist possible pharmaceutical marketplace incentives to avoid abuse. Theoretically, the reputational interest
of drug companies in preserving consumer conﬁdence in their statements should work not only to encourage
self-regulation of fraudulent behavior, but also to encourage drug makers to monitor the educational programs
sponsored by their competitors and report any promotional violations to the FDA.106 Even absent the
threat of FDA enforcement, market forces such as tort liability remain in place to discourage over-promotion
by pharmaceutical companies and deter physicians from prescribing oﬀ-label drugs or therapies without
reliable scientiﬁc support demonstrating safety and eﬀectiveness.107 While physicians won’t be held liable for
103Davis, Ann. “Data Points: Tactic of Drug Makers is Raising Questions About Use of Research.” The Wall Street Journal,
Jan. 7, 2002.
104Id.
105Id.
106Supra note 2 at 1361.
107Id.
24prescribing a drug for unapproved uses that comport with currently accepted medical practice in the relevant
community, doctors will otherwise be held responsible for deviations from approved uses as represented by
the drug label or package insert. Health insurance policies reinforce compliance as unproven or experimental
treatments are not reimbursed by most medical insurance plans.108 However, a disconnect arises between
theory and practice, whereby lax government enforcement leaves room for serious fraud, brought to the
forefront by the current whistle-blower lawsuit pending in federal court in Boston, Massachusetts regarding
the promotion of unapproved uses of the epilepsy drug, Neurontin.
Neurontin: A Case Study:
David Franklin, former employee of Warner-Lambert (which later became Parke-Davis and was acquired by
Pﬁzer Inc. in 2000), claims the drug company forced employee participation in a national marketing scheme
designed to illegally promote Neurontin for oﬀ-label uses (ranging from psychiatric disorders to migraines)
by making exaggerated or false claims of safety and eﬃcacy, bribing doctors with grants and consulting fees,
and signing oﬀ on speakers hand-picked by the industry for continuing medical education courses, supposedly
prepared by independent education providers.109 The U.S. attorney’s oﬃce in Boston, forty-seven states and
the District of Columbia are investigating the allegations begun in 1996 that Warner-Lambert’s promotion
of the oﬀ-label beneﬁts of the drug for uses that aren’t Medicaid-eligible knowingly led doctors to write
inappropriate prescriptions through at least 1998, violating the anti-kickback rules of the federally funded
program.110 In Massachusetts, Neurontin is the ﬁfth most costly drug for the state Medicaid program,
108Id.
109Supra note 92.
110Chesto, Jon. “Suit questions oﬀ-label sales of Neurontin.” Boston Herald, May 18, 2002.
25which spent $21 million on Neurontin last year; sales of the drug nationally, eighty percent of which are for
unapproved uses, are expected to have exceeded $2 billion in 2002.111 The federal government has joined
the suit as a co-plaintiﬀ, seeking repayment for government outlays that were made to cover unapproved-use
prescriptions.112
Four internal company memorandums from 1995, unsealed in federal court in early November 2002, outline
Parke-Davis’ estimated proﬁt of $150 million from the strategy of promoting Neurontin to doctors for bipolar
disorder, social phobias, panic disorder, and neuropathic pain in journals and at medical conferences, without
ﬁrst seeking FDA approval for the oﬀ-label uses.113 The drug company’s reasoning stemmed from a desire
to leave more time for marketing the drug before expiration of the patent in 2000, when generics would then
takeover the market. A “publication strategy” could be accomplished much more quickly than the investment
in clinical trials that would be required to complete the NDA process and secure FDA approval. As part of
this plan to publish studies, Parke-Davis contracted with a Philadelphia ﬁrm, Medical Education Systems,
Inc., for an “educational grant” to develop a “scientiﬁc article series in support of epilepsy.”114 However,
the proposed articles focused mainly on oﬀ-label uses for the drug and Parke-Davis was given the unfettered
right to “select the authors of the articles, receive pre-publication copies of the articles, and suggest changes
to them.”115 In a report entitled “1998 Neurontin Tactics,” a New York City medical advertising ﬁrm hired
by Parke-Davis outlined various strategies for promoting oﬀ-label use, including bipolar CME, even though
psychiatrists said the drug had never been proven eﬀective for these purposes.116
111Kowalczyk, Liz. “Drug Firm Seen Skirting FDA OK: Unapproved Uses Promoted for Proﬁt.” The Boston Globe, Nov. 2,
2002.
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26Franklin’s attorney, Thomas Greene, responded to the pharmaceutical manufacturer’s advertising strategy
by posing the question, “If we’re going to permit a drug company to get narrow approval and then allow
them to market the drug for a whole bunch of unapproved uses, why even have an FDA? How are we going
to protect the public?”117 The obvious danger of permitting drug companies to bypass the rules lies in the
ﬂow of untrustworthy information to doctors and the corresponding impact on inappropriate prescriptions.
The case of Dustin Yankus, a 16-year-old boy who suﬀered from bipolar disorder and committed suicide
in May 2002, raises the question of why doctors turned to Neurontin to treat Dustin’s disorder despite his
complaints during the previous eight months that the drug wasn’t working.118 While Dr. Catherine Clarey,
senior medical director at Pﬁzer, says there is “absolutely no evidence” that Neurontin can cause suicidal
behavior, this does not alleviate the concern about indirect harm presented by the failure to prescribe more
eﬀective medication or seek alternative treatment.119
Neurontin is not the only drug for which oﬀ-label promotion has become a recent issue. A consumer group
ﬁled suit in California Superior Court on December 23, 2002, claiming that Pharmacia Corp. is illegally
promoting use of the drug Bextra for acute pain caused by impacted molars.120 Bextra is FDA-approved only
for chronic pain associated with arthritis, osteoporosis, and menstrual cramps. The lawsuit alleges that the
drug company “went against the spirit of the law” by conducting the study aimed at this oﬀ-label use when
the FDA speciﬁcally refused to approve the company’s request for an indication for acute pain.121 Whether
the attempt to seek FDA permission should cut for or against the drug company promoting oﬀ-label uses is
debatable, though, as the Neurontin case demonstrates a surreptitious approach to avoid the FDA approval
117Supra note 111.
118NPR Programming. “The Selling of Neurontin.” Jan. 16, 2003. Available at: http://www.npr.org.
119Id.
120Associated Press. “California Suit Claims Pharmacia Skirts Marketing Rules.” Los Angeles Times, Dec. 26, 2002.
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27process altogether. Similarly, the FDA cited Allergan, Inc., the maker of Botox Cosmetic wrinkle injections,
for promoting the product for unapproved uses within its drug ads, discussing diﬀerent dosing schedules
that could confuse the physician and suggesting the product is intended to treat signs of aging, when in fact
Botox has only been approved for temporary and limited use for cosmetic purposes.122 Allergan actually
refused to pull the drug ads as requested, opting to draft an oﬃcial response to the agency at which point
the FDA will decide what, if any, action should be taken.123
IV. First Amendment Implications:
The question of whether the First Amendment to the Constitution limits FDA’s regulatory power over adver-
tising is critical to the legal status of restrictions placed upon pharmaceutical manufacturers’ dissemination
of oﬀ-label use information, as well as to the constitutionality of an array of rules that govern how drug com-
panies present their products to doctors and consumers. The Washington Legal Foundation, a free-market,
conservative advocacy group funded by drug makers and other manufacturers, took charge of free-speech
litigation in the 1990s with a series of D.C. federal court cases that altered the framework for regulation.
The original case, Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman (WLF I),124 arose before passage of the
FDAMA and involved WLF’s claim that the 1996 FDA guidance limiting dissemination of oﬀ-label use ma-
terials unconstitutionality infringed the First Amendment rights of both manufacturers and physicians.125
The D.C. District Court borrowed the concept of advertising as “partially protected commercial speech”
from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council.126 The holding of that case was premised on the idea that while truthful advertising is valuable as a
122Adams, Chris. “FDA Calls Botox Claims Misleading.” The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 10, 2002.
123Id.
124WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998).
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28means of conveying useful information about products, commercial speech engaged in for proﬁt is “presumed
to be more durable” than non-commercial speech.127 Having found that oﬀ-label use thus constituted com-
mercial speech deserving of some degree of First Amendment protection, the D.C. District Court in WLF I
applied the four-prong balancing test from the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Hudson128 to determine
whether the restrictions on commercial speech for the purpose of ensuring the safety and eﬃcacy of drugs
exceeded constitutional boundaries. Under the Central Hudson test, a regulation of commercial speech is
constitutionally permissible if “the speech in question concerns lawful activity and is not misleading, the
regulation serves a substantial governmental interest, and the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest without being more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”129 Judge Royce Lamberth
of the D.C. District Court found that while the FDA guidance satisﬁed the ﬁrst three prongs, the fourth
prong was not met since less restrictive alternatives, such as “full, complete, and unambiguous disclosure”
by the pharmaceutical company, were available to advance the FDA’s interests.130 Thus, having concluded
that the FDA policy restricted more speech than was necessary to achieve the public health objective, Judge
Lamberth granted the plaintiﬀ’s motion for summary judgment and issued an injunction to prevent the FDA
from enforcing the oﬀ-label use materials guidance.131
Immediately following issuance of the injunction in WLF I, the FDAMA was passed, prompting the FDA to
ask the court in Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman (WLF II)132 to conﬁne the application of the
injunction to the FDA guidance document. Judge Lamberth denied the FDA’s motion, however, and held
the injunction to apply to Section 401 of the FDAMA. The court in WLF II also requested supplemental
brieﬁng on the constitutionality of the FDAMA provisions addressing oﬀ-label use, later held unconstitu-
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29tional in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney (WLF III).133 The FDA appealed this decision with
respect to the FDAMA provisions (although not the underlying guidance document), leading to the D.C.
Circuit Court decision in WLF IV.134 The court did not reach the constitutional merits of the issue in WLF
IV, choosing instead to dismiss the government’s appeal and vacate part of the district court’s injunction to
the extent it declared the FDAMA unconstitutional. The Circuit Court’s reasoning followed from the FDA’s
concession in briefs and oral arguments that the FDAMA did not authorize the FDA to restrict speech.
The FDA asserted that the “FDAMA established nothing more than a ‘safe harbor’ ensuring that certain
forms of conduct would not be used against manufacturers in misbranding and ‘intended use’ enforcement
actions.”135 The FDA further maintained that it could use dissemination of oﬀ-label use information as evi-
dence in enforcement actions if the manufacturer did not comply with the FDAMA safe harbor, even though
such dissemination would not be considered per se illegal since no independent enforcement authority could
be derived from the FDAMA provisions on oﬀ-label use.136 Thus, WLF IV left the state of the law unclear;
despite the adverse rulings and constitutional signiﬁcance of the earlier WLF First Amendment holdings
protecting oﬀ-label use materials as commercial speech, the FDA retained the ability to regulate oﬀ-label
use materials on a case-by-case basis.137 Moreover, WLF IV left open the issue of whether enforcement
actions by the FDA using provisions of the FDAMA other than Section 401 to limit the dissemination of
oﬀ-label use information could be challenged as unconstitutional by pharmaceutical manufacturers.138
Beyond the context of oﬀ-label use materials, the U.S. Supreme Court recently adjudicated the constitu-
tionality of restrictions on commercial speech concerning the promotion and advertising of compounded
drugs in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center.139 “Drug compounding” is a process by which a
133WLF III, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999).
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30pharmacist alters ingredients to tailor a medication to a patient’s needs, typically when the medication is
not otherwise commercially available.140 The FDAMA exempts compounded drugs from the standard NDA
requirements upon the condition that pharmacies abide by certain restrictions, such as the requirement
that prescriptions for compounded drugs be “unsolicited” and that compounders not advertise or promote
their products.141 Pharmaceutical companies brought suit in Thompson142 to enjoin enforcement of these
restrictions on the grounds that the limitations on advertising and promotion were broader than necessary
to promote the alleged governmental interests in protecting public health and safety, ensuring the integrity
of the drug approval process, and preserving the availability of compounded drugs for patients with partic-
ularized medical needs. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the pharmacies, as did the Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Justice O’Connor. The government attempted to draw a distinction between small-scale
and large-scale drug compounding by recognizing the economic infeasibility of safety and eﬃcacy testing for
the former. Nonetheless, O’Connor held that less restrictive means were available aside from speech-related
restrictions, pointing out that the government “might ban the use of commercial-scale manufacturing in the
production of compounded drugs or prohibit pharmacies from oﬀering compounded drugs at wholesale to
other licensed persons or commercial entities for retail.”143 O’Connor also noted the beneﬁcial aspects of
speech that would be lost with the FDAMA restrictions still in force, as demonstrated by the example of
a pharmacist that would be prevented from informing physicians about the availability of alternative drugs
through compounding, even when that pharmacist had no interest in mass-producing compounded drugs.144
“If the First Amendment means anything, it means that regulating speech must be a last – not ﬁrst – resort,”
O’Connor wrote. “Yet here it seems to have been the ﬁrst strategy the Government thought to try.”145
140Id. at 1500. For example, patients may have an allergy to an ingredient in a mass-produced product or children may need
diluted doses of a medication.
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31The outcome in Thompson146 could be seen as predictable in light of an earlier holding by the federal ap-
peals court in Pearson v. Shalala,147 where the court dealt with labeling claims by a dietary supplement
manufacturer as opposed to a maker of prescription drugs. The 1990 Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act (NLEA) liberalized the FDCA and created a statutory “safe harbor” for dietary supplements and foods
that make health claims so as to enable them to avoid designation as a “drug” and thereby escape the more
extensive approval and labeling requirements for drugs.148 Nonetheless, Pearson149 holds First Amend-
ment doctrinal signiﬁcance here in the context of commercial speech, as the Court of Appeals opted for the
least restrictive means of curing misleading advertisements and directed the FDA on remand to determine
whether a disclaimer could be added to the claim that folic acid reduces the risk of spinal cord defects, rather
than permitting the FDA to ban the claim altogether. Plaintiﬀ supplement manufacturers followed up this
decision in 2001150 by moving for a preliminary injunction challenging the FDA’s application of the legal
standard articulated by the Court of Appeals in 1999. The District Court for the District of Columbia held
a preliminary injunction warranted on the grounds that plaintiﬀs demonstrated a likelihood of success on
the merits that the FDA’s continued refusal to authorize the folic acid health claims, even with disclaimers,
violated the First Amendment.151
In an eﬀort to bring FDA regulations into line with the constitutional trend of these court decisions protecting
commercial speech, FDA general counsel Troy initiated a policy review by seeking public comment during the
period from May through September of 2002.152 Prior to joining the Bush administration, Troy worked on
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32the side of the Washington Legal Foundation in the late 1990s to sue the FDA over promotion and marketing
issues, and advocated for drug and tobacco companies to challenge agency eﬀorts to restrict advertising, so
that the First Amendment has become his “signature issue.”153 Conservative judges, academics, and advo-
cacy groups are leading the push towards a “rules retreat,” however congressional Democrats and consumer
groups strongly oppose any relaxation of the rules they consider to be “vital to the public health.”154 The
former network supports the notion that FDA’s pre-emptive speech rules are overly paternalistic, “based
on false assumptions that the masses are ignorant and today’s pharmaceutical makers are no better than
old time snake oil salesman.”155 Republican House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Tauzin of
Louisiana commented, “I think if a product is legal, we ought to be able to talk about it publicly without
government restricting our conversation.”156 Drugmakers, as well as the National Venture Capital Associ-
ation, argued that the FDA’s current policy applies a “double standard” to the dissemination of oﬀ-label
information in so much as “an independent researcher can freely hand out such a reprint, while the maker of
the drug can’t.”157 In addition to relaxing the rules governing oﬀ-label use promotion, the pharmaceutical
industry wants to eliminate the FDA requirement that manufacturers prominently place the generic name
for a drug alongside its brand name in advertisements, as well as the requirement that drug makers list all
possible side eﬀects in print magazine ads.158
On the other side of the debate, California Democrat Representative Henry Waxman, along with eight other
Democrats, warned in a letter to the FDA that “Americans could lose their lives” if the agency rules were
loosened.159 Waxman stated, “The First Amendment shouldn’t force us to return to a time the public health
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33would be endangered – where manufacturers can proﬁt by giving misinformation or deceptive information,
and where it could be years before any product could be taken oﬀ the market.”160 William B. Schultz and
Michael R. Taylor, former deputy commissioners for policy at the FDA (serving from 1994-1998 and 1991-1994
respectively), wrote an editorial for The Washington Post critiquing the behavior of government lawyers in
calling into question the “common-sense assumptions” of the American public – that drug companies should
be required to demonstrate the safety and eﬀectiveness of their products before they are promoted.161 In
responding to the notion that the First Amendment severely limits the government’s role in monitoring
commercial speech about drugs and other products with serious health consequences, Schultz and Taylor
wrote, “It is hard to imagine that this was the intent of the Founders in 1789 or is in the public’s interest
today.”162 Yet, an editorial appearing in the Washington Post in June 2002 presented the counterargument
that, “If anything places ‘public health protections in jeopardy,’ it is the FDA’s past refusal to consider
potential constitutional limitations on its authority. By seeking public comment on existing programs, the
FDA will be able to ensure that its policies and regulations comply with constitutional requirements and
survive the inevitable legal challenges.”163
The policy balance surrounding free speech arguments for prescription drug information involves a re-
emergence of the underlying tension between personal freedom and scientiﬁc rationality. Critics of oﬀ-label
marketing lean toward the latter value preference as they view the limited regulation of commercial speech
as “more than justiﬁed” by the anticipated savings in health and lives.164 As the academic Dr. Arnold S.
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34Relman observed, “either credible evidence of the safety and eﬀectiveness for unapproved uses of the drug
is lacking, or else the manufacturers simply have not bothered to present existing data to the FDA.”165 In
either case, Relman continued, it is “reasonable” for the public to be “skeptical about such uses of prescrip-
tion drugs.”166 Free speech proponents, though, favoring the value of personal freedom, would reply to an
argument like Relman’s that “quackery is best countered by challenge and debate rather than by stiﬂing the
ﬂow of information.”167 Thus, the question comes down to the meaning attributed to “social cost” and the
angle from which the FDA regulation is perceived, whether in terms of restricting the free ﬂow of information
and hindering medical innovation or protecting the public health and safety and ensuring the dissemination
of reliable data.
Inequity for the Internet?
The FDA has not issued draft or ﬁnal guidance regulations that speciﬁcally pertain to the Internet, leaving
manufacturers room to interpret the general guidelines in ways that may be contrary to the public interest,
but also opening up the possibility of agency scrutiny in every case the Internet is used for prescription drug
advertising since Internet materials do not ﬁt under the FDAMA “safe harbor.”168 In this way, the Internet
functionally enjoys less First Amendment protection than traditional, paper-based materials.169
The World Wide Web allows for creation of “home pages” or “Web sites” which can link to other sites
as well as chat rooms where live discussions on a product can take place.170 The diﬃculty with too little
regulation occurs when a manufacturer “hyperlinks” to the homepages of electronic journals that describe
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35oﬀ-label uses for the manufacturer’s drug product, rather than directly linking to the page that contains a
description of the unapproved use, in an eﬀort to avoid an enforcement action for misbranding. This process
is described as the “two-click rule” because two separate clicks of the mouse are required to reach the oﬀ-label
use materials.171 Failure to enjoin manufacturers from engaging in this practice has created an unwritten
rule of behavior that threatens public health and safety in so much as the links connect to sites that may
be extremely biased or without scientiﬁc merit. The FDA will likely only have authority to regulate links
from regulated companies, as opposed to being able to monitor the Web page of a publication such as the
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA).172 However, links to JAMA do not present as much
of a concern for the FDA as do sites that only discuss the oﬀ-label uses of a drug product.
The diﬃculty with too much regulation, however, lies in the danger of stiﬂing the unique potential of the
Internet and inhibiting free speech if the FDA were to mandate strict compliance with the requirements
that already exist for paper documents. The FDA needs to separately address the role of the Internet in
all relevant regulations and guidances, taking into account currently unresolved issues, such as how a home
page is to be submitted for purposes of obtaining FDA approval, whether that page must be submitted any
time an update is made, and whether interactive and communicative features of a home page must also
be disclosed.173 The international nature of the Internet also raises the question of whether, for example,
a home page – set up in Europe but available in the US – for a multinational company that advertises a
drug approved only in Europe, should be considered an unlawful promotion of an unapproved new drug?174
To what extent can a statement (or disclaimer) saying that the product is (or is not) intended for U.S.
consumers resolve this dilemma?
V. Promotion of Unapproved New Drugs:
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36As part of the standard IND testing protocol, an investigational new drug application must be submitted to
the FDA whenever a pharmaceutical manufacturer wishes to proceed beyond the pre-clinical drug testing on
laboratory animals to the three phases of clinical testing on humans necessary to secure new drug approval.
While an unapproved new drug may be used in human subjects pursuant to the NDA process, the FDA
has consistently taken the position that an IND may not lawfully be “commercialized” prior to approval.175
The FDA also initially took the related position that investigational drugs were to be used solely for inves-
tigational purposes and not for patient treatment; however, this rule eventually gave way to a number of
exceptions, such as “compassionate IND” licenses,176 “treatment INDs,”177 and a “parallel track” policy178
for patients who are unable to participate in clinical trials, to permit expanded use of experimental drugs to
treat serious or life-threatening illnesses for which no alternative therapies are available. The criteria com-
mon to all of these early access programs remain rules restricting commercialization of the investigational
new drugs.
In May 1987, the FDA developed and issued regulations sponsored by the Oﬃce of Management and Bud-
get and passed on June 22nd of that year, codifying the conditions under which treatment INDs can be
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37granted.179 The regulations reiterated the requirement that, “as with all clinical use of investigational
drugs, informed patient consent must be obtained and the product cannot be promoted or otherwise com-
mercialized.”180 More speciﬁcally, the regulations list the conditions that: “the sale does not constitute
commercial marketing of a new drug for which a marketing application has not been approved; the drug is
not being commercially promoted or advertised; and the sponsor of the drug is actively pursing marketing
approval with due diligence.”181 Assuming the absence of any commercialization, manufacturers are given
more latitude to charge for investigational drugs under the treatment IND regulations, as compared with
compassionate use INDs, as long as there is “adequate enrollment in the ongoing clinical trials under the
authorized IND.”182 Sponsors may bill patients on a cost-recovery basis for a drug distributed under a treat-
ment IND, although the amount charged may not exceed the manufacturing, research and development, and
distribution costs.183
The early access period, the time from IND designation to FDA marketing approval, provides early market
exposure for a drug product, and in many cases, the opportunity to develop a positive reputation within
the patient community.184 However, drug companies have also viewed early access to unapproved drugs as
a diversion from getting new products to the market. Pharmaceutical manufacturers fear that the results of
having patients take medications in a less-controlled setting than a clinical trial might hurt manufacturers’
chance for approval of the new drug, as well as detract from participation in the clinical trials under the
179H.R. Rep. No. 1092, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1998): “Criteria for the treatment IND are that (1) there is no satisfactory
alternative treatment for the disease, (2) the drug is under investigation in clinical trials under an FDA-approved IND, and (3)
the sponsor of the clinical trial is actively seeking approvel from the FDA for marketing the new drug. Scientiﬁc evidence must
provide a reasonable basis for concluding (1) that the drug may be eﬀective and (2) that it would not expose the patient to
signiﬁcant risk of additional illness or injury.”
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38authorized IND.185 Patient activism, though, has led the push to encourage drug companies to distribute
more experimental drugs to seriously ill patients and drug companies are realizing that doing so can be an
eﬀective way to market their product before FDA approval.186
The legal problem arises when pharmaceutical manufacturers commercially promote and market new drugs
prior to FDA approval, thereby granting wider access to the drugs without even following the safeguards
that apply to expanded access criteria. As part of the computer-assisted analysis of false and/or misleading
drug promotions by prescription drugmakers between January 1997 through November 2002, Consumer
Reports magazine documented sixty-two citations for the promotion of unapproved medications.187 To
demonstrate the problem and enforcement response, the FDA website displays an example of a request
for a court-ordered preliminary injunction preceded by a warning letter sent to Lane Labs-USA, Inc., the
maker of three unapproved products promoted and sold in 1999, including BeneFin (produced from shark
cartilage as a treatment for cancer and other diseases), SkinAnswer (treatment for skin cancer), and MGN-
3 (a rice-bran extract treatment for cancer and HIV).188 Similarly, the FDA Oﬃce of Regulatory Aﬀairs
“Enforcement Story” lists examples of warnings issued for unlawful promotion of unapproved drugs, such
as the marketing of a drug for relief of chronic skin disorders by Skintech 2000, Inc. without an approved
NDA; likewise, a permanent injunction was obtained against Health World International, Inc. on December
1, 2000, prohibiting them from promoting or advertising their drug products as “safe and/or eﬀective in the
cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of any disease, unless and until an approved new drug application
authorizing such representation is in eﬀect for such drug product.”189
The question of whether a marketing restriction should apply to control access to unapproved new drugs as a
policy matter might appear less clear cut when evaluated in light of the anecdotal stories told by patients and
185Fuhrmans, Vanessa. “How to Get New but Unapproved Drugs.” The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 5, 2002.
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39their family members. For example, the husband and two teenage sons of Ruth-Ann Santino, a 51-year-old
woman who died from colon cancer in 2001, are still ﬁghting to improve access to experimental drugs for
terminal cancer patients.190 Neither the government nor a hospital can force a pharmaceutical company to
hold trials and grant expanded-access to experimental medications for selected patients test subjects who
meet speciﬁc medical criteria and have exhausted all alternative treatment options. However, increasing
public information about clinical trials and encouraging drug companies to open these trials to more patients
are signiﬁcant changes that agencies like the National Cancer Institute are helping to implement.191 A lawsuit
was recently ﬁled against Intermune, Inc. by Jospeh Stendig, age seventy-ﬁve, who was diagnosed two years
ago with a lung disorder known as idiopathic pulmonary ﬁbrosis (IPF), from which patients die an average
of three years after diagnosis.192 Stendig charged Intermune with unfair business practices, alleging that the
pharmaceutical manufacturer is stiﬂing research programs on the drug pirfenidone, a potential treatment for
IPF, in order to prolong the hold of a competitor drug on the market and to avoid the diﬃculty of signing up
clinical trial subjects for the NDA process.193 Intermune’s executive vice president of medical and scientiﬁc
aﬀairs disputes this allegation, claiming that the “company has actually accelerated the schedule for clinical
development of the drug.”194 According to Paul Lombardo, a former California health care attorney and
current University of Virginia professor of research regulations, Stendig’s suit might no go forward anyway
for lack of standing. “To win, he’d have to prove his claim that his health is declining because he can’t get
pirfenidone. To do that, he’d have to prove that the experimental drug works. That may only be possible if
Intermune can complete controlled clinical trials.”195
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40The beneﬁts of speeding seriously ill patients’ access to potentially life-saving drugs and avoiding the costs of
time and expense associated with the lengthy NDA process must be oﬀset against the safety and eﬀectiveness
concerns that underlie the drug approval process in the ﬁrst place. Critiques of treatment INDs surface from
citizen advocacy groups, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, the FDA, and seriously ill patients
alike, albeit for diﬀerent reasons: the concern that treatment INDs “clearly circumvent the legal requirement
that a drug be proven eﬀective before marketing,” the fear that granting treatment INDs will “draw potential
subjects away from the clinical trials necessary for full FDA approval,” the complaint that treatment INDs
have “such narrowly deﬁned criteria that only a small number of patients can actually qualify to receive the
drug,” and the criticism that treatment INDs are “only available to wealthy, well-connected patients” since
the treatments are not covered by private health insurance or Medicaid and must be carefully supervised
by a physician.196 The danger of commercializing as yet unproven drugs ties into the need for scientiﬁc
rationality. A company may promote a drug simply to attract investors to fund further development, even
when the drug is not suitable for use, either because at best, the drug has no therapeutic value, or at worst,
the drug has serious or fatal side-eﬀects. With insuﬃcient details known about potential side eﬀects and
eﬀectiveness, bringing new drugs to the market attaches a risk-beneﬁt calculation to speeding the “journey
from laboratory to bedside” for devastating illnesses.197 What makes this analysis so diﬃcult is that the goal
of protecting public health and safety can be logically situated on either side of the line between permitting
and prohibiting access.
VI. Recommendations:
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41The FDA’s enforcement tools, as conferred by the FDCA, include injunctive relief, criminal penalties, and
seizure powers. This section will consider other suggested measures to curb false and misleading advertise-
ments, promotion of unapproved uses of approved drugs, and commercialization of still-experimental drugs.
While the inherent push-pull tension between scientiﬁc rationality and personal freedom can’t ever be fully
reconciled, action can be taken to mitigate the pervasive fraud and consequent adverse public health and
economic eﬀects that surface from a relaxation of the rules governing pharmaceutical manufacturers’ pro-
motional practices.
The FDA currently lacks the authority to levy civil monetary penalties for violative conduct pertaining to
the marketing of prescription drugs, despite having been given the authority to levy ﬁnes of up to $1,000,000
per proceeding on device manufacturers and involved individuals under the Safe Medical Devices Act of
1990.198 In discussing its ability to regulate prescription drug promotions at a 1994 congressional hearing,
the FDA testiﬁed that, “The main issue here is not science ...or taking care of patients; the main issue
here is money and how to get more of it. And ...when you’re trying to basically ﬁght economic crimes,
you have to be able to ﬁght money with money.”199 Politicians are responding to the FDA’s assertion with
various legislative proposals, such as giving the FDA the authority to levy up to $10 million in ﬁnes for false
or misleading drug advertising, limiting the federal tax deductions drugmakers can take for advertising to
the amount they take for research and development, requiring disclosure of ad revenues and eliminating tax
deductions for advertising altogether, urging the federal government to adopt stricter standards, etc.200
Recommendations for enhancing FDA enforcement also include amending or supplementing current FDA
regulations with more stringent requirements when prescription drugs are advertised directly to consumers.
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42President of the National Consumers League, Linda Golodner, suggests that the government should require
“easier-to-understand” side eﬀect information on ads, which often appear in “virtually unreadable, jargon-
ﬁlled ﬁne print.”201 Use of “patient-friendly language” in addition to a standard percentile over which all
adverse reactions are reported, may be a way to cut down on the complete list of side eﬀects while pro-
viding a uniform number with which patients can accurately make comparison judgments between related
medications.202 In assessing how DTC ads can best contribute to a more informed consumer, the question
arises as to whether an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine should be carved out for these ads,
thereby imposing a legally recognized duty upon manufacturers to directly warn consumers about potential
risks.203 In addition to the diﬃculty of manufacturers conveying an adequate warning to the consumer
(since a physician’s decision to prescribe a certain treatment is based on a complex set of factors relating to
the patient’s individual characteristics and preferences, clinical diagnosis and treatment options), however,
there would likely be a “chilling eﬀect” on the use of DTC ads that results from potential liability. Such a
dramatic cutback would, in turn, deprive consumers of the beneﬁts discussed earlier under Part II of this
paper, such as calling attention to under-treated disorders and improving patient compliance with medical
treatments.204 Perhaps a better approach to curbing false and/or misleading drug advertisements would be
to strengthen FDA enforcement by increasing eﬃciency. In response to the HSS policy requiring legal review
of all regulatory letters before they are sent to prescription drugmakers, either the FDA should design a
method to speed up its review process or Congress should authorize funds for more reviewers to screen drug
ads to ensure prompt withdrawal of misleading ads before they run their broadcast cycle.205
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43Improving regulation of DTC ads to increase consumer protection may also be a means of controlling soaring
prescription drug prices, going back to the problem of costly new drugs being promoted to replace older drugs
at the time the patent expires without proportionately improving beneﬁts. The Oregon Health Plan adopted
a two-step procedure in 2001 to replace expensive brand-name drugs with substitutes that are as eﬀective
but cheaper: First, “discover and list which drugs oﬀer the greatest beneﬁts at the lowest costs. Then
train doctors to prescribe drugs from this so-called formulary in most cases.”206 Having panels of experts
check new drugs against others used for the same illnesses is intended to keep “oﬀ-the-mark prescriptions,
excessive utilization and overdoses, adverse reactions, and therapeutic failures” to a minimum while reigning
in costs.207 Similarly, the Consumer Reports study concluded that Congress should enact legislation to
promote independent analysis of the relative cost and eﬃcacy of competing medications to give doctors and
consumers a source of reliable, unbiased information.
As part of exploring alternative strategies for enforcement, it is important to recognize that protective mech-
anisms exist to control pharmaceutical manufacturers’ dissemination of oﬀ-label uses for approved drugs
outside of regulatory restrictions on commercial speech. Product liability law and the failure to warn arises
under the “learned intermediary doctrine” when pharmaceutical manufacturers do not provide “reasonable
instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm” to the prescribing physician.208 Thus, manu-
factures might resist disseminating oﬀ-label information in order to be able to invoke the defense of FDA
approval which bars punitive damages in four states (Arizona, Ohio, Oregon, and Utah) and is at least
one factor considered by other jurisdictions.209 Whether the “FDA Defense” should act as a complete bar
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44to product liability actions remains uncertain, though a law like the 1995 product liability bill passed by
the House of Representatives210 would arguably provide companies with an additional incentive to conduct
the studies needed to obtain FDA approval of oﬀ-label indications for the drugs. Another means to aﬀect
companies’ incentive structure would be a recommendation that the FDA give priority review to NDAs
submitted in conjunction with manufacturers’ applications to promote oﬀ-label uses for already-approved
drug products.211 This process would protect the FDA’s safety and eﬀectiveness mandate as well as increase
the marketability of drugs for manufacturers that have received the FDA seal of approval.
The Lanham Act, which provides for a cause of action for unfair competition resulting from false advertis-
ing, is another means to protect consumers from manufacturers’ misrepresentations about their own as well
as competitor’s products with respect to the dissemination of oﬀ-label information. False scientiﬁc estab-
lishment claims most often form the basis of Lanham Act cases associated with pharmaceutical products,
usually including fact patterns relating to “no ‘real’ science, distortion of science, old science that is no
longer relevant, unreliable science, and/or good science, but the data does not support the statement.”212
However, as the dissemination of scientiﬁc data published in a peer-reviewed journal isn’t necessarily “false
and misleading” just because it doesn’t meet the evidentiary standard of “substantial evidence” required for
FDA-approval of the use, the Lanham Act is not always as far-reaching as the marketing violation under
the FDCA.213
The need for manufacturers to retain credibility and build a positive reputation in the competitive pharma-
ceutical marketplace should itself, in theory, play a role in discouraging manufacturers’ provision of oﬀ-label
information about their product. However, as discussed earlier, the inability of consumers to assess the
210Id. at 116. The 1995 product liability bill, although not enacted into law, contained an FDA Defense provision that stated
punitive damages would not be awarded against a manufacturer “if the product involved was subject to pre-market approval
by the FDA ...and such drug was approved by the FDA.” Punitive damages would also be barred “if the drug is generally
recognized as safe and eﬀective pursuant to conditions established by the FDA and applicable regulations, including packaging
and labeling.”
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45qualities of the drug product without ﬁrst using the product, thereby subjecting themselves to the possi-
bility of direct adverse side eﬀects or indirect health eﬀects from the failure to use alternative medication,
prevents manufacturers’ economic self-interest from correcting the market failure of asymmetric informa-
tion. Yet, the argument can be made that since the FDAMA limits the relaxation of oﬀ-label marketing
rules to speciﬁc enumerated groups that include physicians and other qualiﬁed health care professionals, the
ﬂow of information is restricted enough that manufacturers can monitor themselves as long as there is full
disclosure to physicians and patients.214 As discussed under Part III of this paper, the FDAMA provisions
that cover disclosure requirements to physicians, such as identifying sources of funding for the research cited
and disclosing any conﬂicts of interests, are intended to compel pharmaceutical manufacturers to provide a
more balanced, complete picture of their oﬀ-label marketing practices so that medical professionals gain an
unbiased understanding of the beneﬁts and risks of the oﬀ-label use. Providing full disclosure to patients by
requiring doctors to tell their patients that the oﬀ-label treatments have not been approved by the FDA,
to explain the known risks and beneﬁts, and then to permit the patients to decide whether to undertake a
certain treatment, ultimately shifts the decision-making responsibility onto the patients. This approach leans
toward the personal freedom policy viewpoint, preserving commercial speech rights and framing the issue
as one of “empowerment” for patients, while subjugating patient safety concerns to the notion of medical
progress.215
Conclusion:
The competing good values of scientiﬁc rationality versus personal freedom, often expressed in terms of
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46safety and eﬀectiveness versus medical innovation, reliable and objective information dissemination versus
unrestrained commercial speech, are not necessarily mutually exclusive in full. There is room for overlap in
views as the preference holder travels further away from the extremes, perhaps best displayed by the expanded
access programs that permit use of unapproved drugs for treatment purposes in limited cases. However, there
is a constant, reciprocal tension underneath these policy perspectives that drives the direction of the law, best
uncovered by juxtaposing changes in the structure of the law with the marketing practices of prescription
drug manufacturers. The trend toward a relaxation of the rules restricting the promotional behavior of
the pharmaceutical industry – with the expansion of advertising mediums, slower FDA response time to
misleading DTC advertisements, FDAMA provisions liberating the dissemination of oﬀ-label information to
physicians, and recent First Amendment court decisions embracing protected commercial speech – reveals
the contemporary triumph of the personal freedom approach... and the accompanying marketplace of frauds.
With the statutory aim of protecting the public health and safety, the FDA must decide how best to modify
its enforcement strategy so as to re-align the policy balance to meet drugmakers promotional violations and
the public’s economic and health related expectations, while preserving incentives for medical progress and
upholding the constitutional principles of free speech.
47